Two layered changes shipped in this branch: == 1.0.0-22: app-level authentication == The dashboard previously had only an IP allowlist. Adds username + bcrypt password auth, signed-cookie sessions, and a "first user setup" flow. * New app/auth.py: User dataclass, bcrypt hash/verify, get_user_by_id/ username, create_user, touch_last_login, FastAPI `get_current_user` dependency. Session secret loaded from SESSION_SECRET env or persisted to /data/session_secret. * New app/auth_cli.py: `python -m app.auth_cli list|reset|add` for out-of-band user management. Passwords always read from a TTY prompt. * Schema: idempotent ALTER for `users` table (id, username unique, password_hash, full_name, is_admin, created_at, last_login_at). * main.py: SessionMiddleware (HMAC-signed cookie, max-age 7 days, SameSite=strict — see hardening section) + _AuthGateMiddleware that populates request.state.current_user and bounces unauth'd HTML GETs to /login while returning 401 JSON for everything else. * Routes: GET /login renders first-user-setup form when users table is empty otherwise sign-in form; POST /login; POST /api/v1/auth/setup (only works while empty); GET|POST /logout. * Bootstrap: env vars INITIAL_ADMIN_USERNAME + INITIAL_ADMIN_PASSWORD create the first admin on startup if both set AND users table empty. Ignored thereafter — change passwords via UI or CLI. * Layout: header shows current_user.full_name|username + Logout link. Modal operator field auto-fills from the logged-in user via <meta name="default-operator"> rendered in layout (replaces the localStorage-only previous behaviour). * requirements.txt: pinned bcrypt>=4.0,<5.0, itsdangerous>=2.1, python-multipart>=0.0.7. First step toward addressing the unpinned-deps gotcha. * New app/templates/login.html with first-user-setup variant. == 1.0.0-23: hardening sweep == Closes the eight-item gap audit: * DB retention + automated backup. New app/retention.py runs daily at 03:00 local. Nulls burnin_stages.log_text on stages older than retention_log_days (default 35), VACUUMs to reclaim pages, then runs `sqlite3 .backup` to /data/backups/app-YYYY-MM-DD.db keeping the retention_backup_keep most recent (default 14). Wired into the lifespan supervisor next to mailer/poller. * CSRF mitigation. SessionMiddleware bumped to SameSite=strict so the browser refuses to send the session cookie on cross-site POSTs — removes the actual CSRF vector. Trade-off: external links into the app require re-auth. * Login rate limiting. In-memory per-username AND per-source-IP failure counters in auth.py. 10 failures within 10 min trips a 15-min lockout for both keys. Returns HTTP 429 with a clear "try again in N min" message. Cleared on successful login. * Login audit events. New event types in audit_events: user_login, user_login_failed, user_login_locked_out, user_logout, user_password_changed. All include source IP. Recorded via auth.audit_auth_event(). * Password change UI. Header link "Change password" opens templates/components/modal_password.html (current/new/confirm). Posts to POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — bcrypt-verifies current, requires >=8 char new pw, writes audit event. * NVMe burn-in path. _stage_surface_validate now detects nvme* devnames and routes to _stage_surface_validate_nvme() which runs `nvme format -s 1 --force` (cryptographic erase). Seconds vs hours of badblocks, exercises the controller's secure-erase. Falls back to badblocks if nvme-cli isn't installed. Post-format SMART check. * Mounted-FS detection. ssh_client.get_mounted_drives() runs `findmnt -no SOURCE`, parses non-ZFS sources back to base devnames. Poller treats them as pool_name='(mounted)', pool_role='mounted'. Confirm token DESTROY MOUNTED FILESYSTEM, distinct purple styling, audit event mounted_drive_unlocked, daily-report banner picks it up. * Deeper /health. Real readiness check — DB write probe (PRAGMA journal_mode), poller freshness (age <= 3x stale_threshold), SSH test_connection() when configured. Returns 503 when any check fails so a proxy/orchestrator can take the container out of rotation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
111 lines
4.9 KiB
Python
111 lines
4.9 KiB
Python
from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, SettingsConfigDict
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class Settings(BaseSettings):
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model_config = SettingsConfigDict(
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env_file=".env",
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env_file_encoding="utf-8",
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case_sensitive=False,
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)
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app_host: str = "0.0.0.0"
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app_port: int = 8080
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db_path: str = "/data/app.db"
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truenas_base_url: str = "http://localhost:8000"
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truenas_api_key: str = "mock-key"
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truenas_verify_tls: bool = False
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poll_interval_seconds: int = 12
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stale_threshold_seconds: int = 45
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max_parallel_burnins: int = 2
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surface_validate_seconds: int = 45 # mock simulation duration
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io_validate_seconds: int = 25 # mock simulation duration
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# Logging
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log_level: str = "INFO"
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# Security — comma-separated IPs or CIDRs, e.g. "10.0.0.0/24,127.0.0.1"
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# Empty string means allow all (default).
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allowed_ips: str = ""
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# SMTP — daily status email at 8am local time
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# Leave smtp_host empty to disable email.
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smtp_host: str = ""
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smtp_port: int = 587
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smtp_user: str = ""
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smtp_password: str = ""
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smtp_from: str = ""
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smtp_to: str = "" # comma-separated recipients
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smtp_report_hour: int = 8 # local hour to send (0-23)
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smtp_daily_report_enabled: bool = True # set False to skip daily report without disabling alerts
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smtp_alert_on_fail: bool = True # immediate email when a job fails
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smtp_alert_on_pass: bool = False # immediate email when a job passes
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smtp_ssl_mode: str = "starttls" # "starttls" | "ssl" | "plain"
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smtp_timeout: int = 60 # connection + read timeout in seconds
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# Webhook — POST JSON payload on every job state change (pass/fail)
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# Leave empty to disable. Works with Slack, Discord, ntfy, n8n, etc.
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webhook_url: str = ""
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# Stuck-job detection: jobs running longer than this are marked 'unknown'
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stuck_job_hours: int = 24
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# Temperature thresholds (°C) — drives table colouring + precheck gate
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temp_warn_c: int = 46 # orange warning
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temp_crit_c: int = 55 # red critical (precheck refuses to start above this)
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# Bad-block tolerance — surface_validate fails if bad blocks exceed this
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bad_block_threshold: int = 0
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# Surface-validate (badblocks) tunables — defaults match the Spearfoot
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# disk-burnin.sh community script's recommended geometry for large HDDs.
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# block_size : -b in bytes; aligned to AF (4 KiB) sectors. Bumping
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# to 8192 roughly halves badblocks runtime on multi-TB
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# drives at the cost of ~2x RAM in the test buffer.
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# block_buffer : -c blocks held in memory per IO. 64 = badblocks
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# default. Higher values = larger buffer, faster IO,
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# more RAM (block_size * block_buffer bytes per pass).
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# passes : -p value. 1 = repeat until one consecutive clean
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# scan (current behavior). 2-3 for paranoid burn-in
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# that re-confirms after finding errors.
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surface_validate_block_size: int = 4096
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surface_validate_block_buffer: int = 64
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surface_validate_passes: int = 1
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# SSH credentials for direct TrueNAS command execution (Stage 7)
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# When ssh_host is set, burn-in stages use SSH for smartctl/badblocks instead of REST API.
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# Leave ssh_host empty to use the mock/REST API (development mode).
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ssh_host: str = ""
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ssh_port: int = 22
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ssh_user: str = "root" # TrueNAS CORE default is root
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ssh_password: str = "" # Password auth (leave blank if using key)
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ssh_key: str = "" # PEM private key content (paste full key including headers)
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# Application version — used by the /api/v1/updates/check endpoint
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app_version: str = "1.0.0-23"
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# ---- Authentication (1.0.0-22) ----
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# session_secret: HMAC key for signing session cookies. Empty = generate
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# one and persist to /data/session_secret on first run (sessions survive
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# restarts but rotate if the file is deleted). Set explicitly via
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# SESSION_SECRET env var if you want to share secrets across replicas.
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session_secret: str = ""
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session_max_age_seconds: int = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 # 7 days
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# Initial admin bootstrap. If both env vars are set AND the users table
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# is empty at startup, create that account immediately. After that the
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# env vars are ignored — change passwords via the UI / database, not
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# by editing compose.yml.
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initial_admin_username: str = ""
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initial_admin_password: str = ""
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# ---- Retention + backup (1.0.0-23) ----
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# log_days : burnin_stages.log_text NULLed out after this many days
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# (history rows themselves are preserved). Default keeps
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# ~5 weeks; long-soak burn-ins typically finish in <2.
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# backup_keep: number of nightly DB snapshots to keep in /data/backups.
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retention_log_days: int = 35
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retention_backup_keep: int = 14
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settings = Settings()
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