Two layered changes shipped in this branch: == 1.0.0-22: app-level authentication == The dashboard previously had only an IP allowlist. Adds username + bcrypt password auth, signed-cookie sessions, and a "first user setup" flow. * New app/auth.py: User dataclass, bcrypt hash/verify, get_user_by_id/ username, create_user, touch_last_login, FastAPI `get_current_user` dependency. Session secret loaded from SESSION_SECRET env or persisted to /data/session_secret. * New app/auth_cli.py: `python -m app.auth_cli list|reset|add` for out-of-band user management. Passwords always read from a TTY prompt. * Schema: idempotent ALTER for `users` table (id, username unique, password_hash, full_name, is_admin, created_at, last_login_at). * main.py: SessionMiddleware (HMAC-signed cookie, max-age 7 days, SameSite=strict — see hardening section) + _AuthGateMiddleware that populates request.state.current_user and bounces unauth'd HTML GETs to /login while returning 401 JSON for everything else. * Routes: GET /login renders first-user-setup form when users table is empty otherwise sign-in form; POST /login; POST /api/v1/auth/setup (only works while empty); GET|POST /logout. * Bootstrap: env vars INITIAL_ADMIN_USERNAME + INITIAL_ADMIN_PASSWORD create the first admin on startup if both set AND users table empty. Ignored thereafter — change passwords via UI or CLI. * Layout: header shows current_user.full_name|username + Logout link. Modal operator field auto-fills from the logged-in user via <meta name="default-operator"> rendered in layout (replaces the localStorage-only previous behaviour). * requirements.txt: pinned bcrypt>=4.0,<5.0, itsdangerous>=2.1, python-multipart>=0.0.7. First step toward addressing the unpinned-deps gotcha. * New app/templates/login.html with first-user-setup variant. == 1.0.0-23: hardening sweep == Closes the eight-item gap audit: * DB retention + automated backup. New app/retention.py runs daily at 03:00 local. Nulls burnin_stages.log_text on stages older than retention_log_days (default 35), VACUUMs to reclaim pages, then runs `sqlite3 .backup` to /data/backups/app-YYYY-MM-DD.db keeping the retention_backup_keep most recent (default 14). Wired into the lifespan supervisor next to mailer/poller. * CSRF mitigation. SessionMiddleware bumped to SameSite=strict so the browser refuses to send the session cookie on cross-site POSTs — removes the actual CSRF vector. Trade-off: external links into the app require re-auth. * Login rate limiting. In-memory per-username AND per-source-IP failure counters in auth.py. 10 failures within 10 min trips a 15-min lockout for both keys. Returns HTTP 429 with a clear "try again in N min" message. Cleared on successful login. * Login audit events. New event types in audit_events: user_login, user_login_failed, user_login_locked_out, user_logout, user_password_changed. All include source IP. Recorded via auth.audit_auth_event(). * Password change UI. Header link "Change password" opens templates/components/modal_password.html (current/new/confirm). Posts to POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — bcrypt-verifies current, requires >=8 char new pw, writes audit event. * NVMe burn-in path. _stage_surface_validate now detects nvme* devnames and routes to _stage_surface_validate_nvme() which runs `nvme format -s 1 --force` (cryptographic erase). Seconds vs hours of badblocks, exercises the controller's secure-erase. Falls back to badblocks if nvme-cli isn't installed. Post-format SMART check. * Mounted-FS detection. ssh_client.get_mounted_drives() runs `findmnt -no SOURCE`, parses non-ZFS sources back to base devnames. Poller treats them as pool_name='(mounted)', pool_role='mounted'. Confirm token DESTROY MOUNTED FILESYSTEM, distinct purple styling, audit event mounted_drive_unlocked, daily-report banner picks it up. * Deeper /health. Real readiness check — DB write probe (PRAGMA journal_mode), poller freshness (age <= 3x stale_threshold), SSH test_connection() when configured. Returns 503 when any check fails so a proxy/orchestrator can take the container out of rotation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
32 lines
1.4 KiB
HTML
32 lines
1.4 KiB
HTML
<div id="password-modal" class="modal-overlay" hidden aria-modal="true" role="dialog">
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<div class="modal">
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<div class="modal-header">
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<h2 class="modal-title">Change password</h2>
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<button class="modal-close" id="password-modal-close-btn" aria-label="Close">✕</button>
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</div>
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<div class="modal-body">
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<div class="form-group">
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<label class="form-label" for="pw-current">Current password</label>
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<input class="form-input" type="password" id="pw-current"
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autocomplete="current-password" required>
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</div>
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<div class="form-group">
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<label class="form-label" for="pw-new">New password (8+ characters)</label>
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<input class="form-input" type="password" id="pw-new"
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autocomplete="new-password" required minlength="8">
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</div>
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<div class="form-group">
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<label class="form-label" for="pw-confirm">Confirm new password</label>
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<input class="form-input" type="password" id="pw-confirm"
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autocomplete="new-password" required minlength="8">
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<div class="confirm-hint" id="pw-hint"></div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<div class="modal-footer">
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<button class="btn-secondary" id="password-modal-cancel-btn">Cancel</button>
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<button class="btn-danger" id="password-modal-submit-btn" disabled>Change password</button>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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