1a19252019
Two layers of defence-in-depth scanning:
* `.forgejo/workflows/security-scan.yml` — runs pip-audit, bandit, and
gitleaks on every push, every PR, and nightly at 07:00 UTC. Activates
when the forge has a runner; harmless no-op until then. Bandit is
invoked with `--skip B608` because every dynamic SQL build in this
codebase uses bound parameters for data and structural placeholders
only — we still catch real injection through code review.
* `scripts/security-scan.sh` + systemd `service`/`timer` — maple-side
daily scanner that runs the same three tools entirely in containers
(no host pollution). Differences from the forge job:
- pip-audit runs INSIDE the live container against installed
packages, catching new CVEs in transitives requirements.txt
doesn't pin (e.g. starlette breaking changes shipping in 1.0).
- bandit scans the LIVE deploy dir at
~/docker/stacks/truenas-burnin/app/, not a fresh git checkout —
so drift between forge HEAD and prod surfaces here too.
- gitleaks scans a managed clone in ~/scan-checkouts/, kept
fast-forward to origin/main.
Output: ~/security-scans/scan-YYYY-MM-DD/{summary,pip-audit,bandit,
gitleaks}.txt with 30-day retention. ~/security-scans/findings.log
appended on any non-zero exit. SECURITY_SCAN_WEBHOOK env in the
service unit lets you POST findings to Mattermost / Slack / etc. once
you decide where alerts should land.
First-run findings already actioned in this commit:
* pip-audit caught 3 CVEs in `pip` itself (CVE-2025-8869,
CVE-2026-1703, CVE-2026-3219). Dockerfile now upgrades pip to
>=26.0 before installing the rest.
* bandit's B608 SQL-injection heuristic flagged two f-string SQL
constructions in `_upsert_drive` and `_fetch_drives_for_template`.
Both were structural concatenation (column-list selection,
'?,?,?' placeholder count), not data interpolation, but refactored
from f-string to explicit concatenation so a future reviewer
doesn't have to relitigate.
* bandit's B104 (binding to 0.0.0.0) annotated with inline `# nosec
B104` — container deliberately binds all interfaces; nginx-proxy-
manager fronts it.
* gitleaks: 0 secrets across 14 commits. Clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
111 lines
5 KiB
Python
111 lines
5 KiB
Python
from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, SettingsConfigDict
|
|
|
|
|
|
class Settings(BaseSettings):
|
|
model_config = SettingsConfigDict(
|
|
env_file=".env",
|
|
env_file_encoding="utf-8",
|
|
case_sensitive=False,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
app_host: str = "0.0.0.0" # nosec B104 — container deliberately binds all interfaces; nginx-proxy-manager fronts it.
|
|
app_port: int = 8080
|
|
db_path: str = "/data/app.db"
|
|
|
|
truenas_base_url: str = "http://localhost:8000"
|
|
truenas_api_key: str = "mock-key"
|
|
truenas_verify_tls: bool = False
|
|
|
|
poll_interval_seconds: int = 12
|
|
stale_threshold_seconds: int = 45
|
|
max_parallel_burnins: int = 2
|
|
surface_validate_seconds: int = 45 # mock simulation duration
|
|
io_validate_seconds: int = 25 # mock simulation duration
|
|
|
|
# Logging
|
|
log_level: str = "INFO"
|
|
|
|
# Security — comma-separated IPs or CIDRs, e.g. "10.0.0.0/24,127.0.0.1"
|
|
# Empty string means allow all (default).
|
|
allowed_ips: str = ""
|
|
|
|
# SMTP — daily status email at 8am local time
|
|
# Leave smtp_host empty to disable email.
|
|
smtp_host: str = ""
|
|
smtp_port: int = 587
|
|
smtp_user: str = ""
|
|
smtp_password: str = ""
|
|
smtp_from: str = ""
|
|
smtp_to: str = "" # comma-separated recipients
|
|
smtp_report_hour: int = 8 # local hour to send (0-23)
|
|
smtp_daily_report_enabled: bool = True # set False to skip daily report without disabling alerts
|
|
smtp_alert_on_fail: bool = True # immediate email when a job fails
|
|
smtp_alert_on_pass: bool = False # immediate email when a job passes
|
|
smtp_ssl_mode: str = "starttls" # "starttls" | "ssl" | "plain"
|
|
smtp_timeout: int = 60 # connection + read timeout in seconds
|
|
|
|
# Webhook — POST JSON payload on every job state change (pass/fail)
|
|
# Leave empty to disable. Works with Slack, Discord, ntfy, n8n, etc.
|
|
webhook_url: str = ""
|
|
|
|
# Stuck-job detection: jobs running longer than this are marked 'unknown'
|
|
stuck_job_hours: int = 24
|
|
|
|
# Temperature thresholds (°C) — drives table colouring + precheck gate
|
|
temp_warn_c: int = 46 # orange warning
|
|
temp_crit_c: int = 55 # red critical (precheck refuses to start above this)
|
|
|
|
# Bad-block tolerance — surface_validate fails if bad blocks exceed this
|
|
bad_block_threshold: int = 0
|
|
|
|
# Surface-validate (badblocks) tunables — defaults match the Spearfoot
|
|
# disk-burnin.sh community script's recommended geometry for large HDDs.
|
|
# block_size : -b in bytes; aligned to AF (4 KiB) sectors. Bumping
|
|
# to 8192 roughly halves badblocks runtime on multi-TB
|
|
# drives at the cost of ~2x RAM in the test buffer.
|
|
# block_buffer : -c blocks held in memory per IO. 64 = badblocks
|
|
# default. Higher values = larger buffer, faster IO,
|
|
# more RAM (block_size * block_buffer bytes per pass).
|
|
# passes : -p value. 1 = repeat until one consecutive clean
|
|
# scan (current behavior). 2-3 for paranoid burn-in
|
|
# that re-confirms after finding errors.
|
|
surface_validate_block_size: int = 4096
|
|
surface_validate_block_buffer: int = 64
|
|
surface_validate_passes: int = 1
|
|
|
|
# SSH credentials for direct TrueNAS command execution (Stage 7)
|
|
# When ssh_host is set, burn-in stages use SSH for smartctl/badblocks instead of REST API.
|
|
# Leave ssh_host empty to use the mock/REST API (development mode).
|
|
ssh_host: str = ""
|
|
ssh_port: int = 22
|
|
ssh_user: str = "root" # TrueNAS CORE default is root
|
|
ssh_password: str = "" # Password auth (leave blank if using key)
|
|
ssh_key: str = "" # PEM private key content (paste full key including headers)
|
|
|
|
# Application version — used by the /api/v1/updates/check endpoint
|
|
app_version: str = "1.0.0-24"
|
|
|
|
# ---- Authentication (1.0.0-22) ----
|
|
# session_secret: HMAC key for signing session cookies. Empty = generate
|
|
# one and persist to /data/session_secret on first run (sessions survive
|
|
# restarts but rotate if the file is deleted). Set explicitly via
|
|
# SESSION_SECRET env var if you want to share secrets across replicas.
|
|
session_secret: str = ""
|
|
session_max_age_seconds: int = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 # 7 days
|
|
# Initial admin bootstrap. If both env vars are set AND the users table
|
|
# is empty at startup, create that account immediately. After that the
|
|
# env vars are ignored — change passwords via the UI / database, not
|
|
# by editing compose.yml.
|
|
initial_admin_username: str = ""
|
|
initial_admin_password: str = ""
|
|
|
|
# ---- Retention + backup (1.0.0-23) ----
|
|
# log_days : burnin_stages.log_text NULLed out after this many days
|
|
# (history rows themselves are preserved). Default keeps
|
|
# ~5 weeks; long-soak burn-ins typically finish in <2.
|
|
# backup_keep: number of nightly DB snapshots to keep in /data/backups.
|
|
retention_log_days: int = 35
|
|
retention_backup_keep: int = 14
|
|
|
|
|
|
settings = Settings()
|