066fbbc403
Addresses 12 of 13 findings from the Codex tech-debt + security review of versions 1.0.0-22 through 1.0.0-27. Item #5 (live pool re-check before start_job) deferred — would add an SSH round-trip per start. #1 Pool detection now treats zpool / lsblk / findmnt failures INDEPENDENTLY. Previously a single None blew away the whole map, so a host where lsblk lacks zfs_member info but zpool works would never lock pool members. Extended findmnt parser to recognise /dev/mapper/*, /dev/dm-*, /dev/md*, /dev/da*, /dev/ada* (LVM, devicemapper, MD RAID, FreeBSD CORE devnames). #2 Admin role enforced on every settings mutation. New auth.require_admin() helper applied to GET /settings, POST /api/v1/settings, /test-smtp, /test-ssh. Previously any authenticated user (the CLI explicitly supports non-admin accounts) could rewrite SMTP/SSH/API secrets. #3 First-user setup race closed. auth.create_user() now accepts bootstrap_only=True which wraps the existence check + insert in BEGIN IMMEDIATE so two concurrent /api/v1/auth/setup requests can't both create admin accounts during the bootstrap window. #4 Case-insensitive uniqueness enforced via new `uniq_users_username_nocase` index. Login does NOCASE lookup so without this `Admin` and `admin` could coexist as distinct rows. #6 New `session_cookie_secure` setting (default False for LAN/dev deploys, set True in production behind HTTPS) flips the session cookie's Secure flag. Defends against on-the-wire exposure when the dashboard is reachable over plain HTTP. #7 Audit trail bound to authenticated identity. Burn-in start / cancel / unlock / drive reset all now use `_operator_for(request)` which reads `request.state.current_user.full_name|username` instead of the body's operator field. Logged-in users can no longer spoof attribution. Drive reset's literal-"operator" fallback (window._operator was never set) is also fixed by this. #8 Login rate-limit race fixed. New `register_login_attempt()` is atomic check-AND-increment in synchronous code (no awaits inside), so a parallel burst can't slip past the threshold. `record_login_failure()` removed; `clear_login_failures()` now also drops any active lockout for a successful auth. Pre-existing bug where `tripped` was always False (so user_login_locked_out audit events never fired) also fixed. #9 NVMe surface_validate post-format check now mirrors the SSH path: fails on FAILED health AND on real SMART attribute failures, soft-passes SSH-only failures (logged), surfaces warnings to the stage log without failing. #10 retention.backup_db() now writes to `.tmp` then atomic-renames into the canonical daily slot — an interrupted backup leaves the tmp behind but doesn't corrupt the real snapshot. Scheduler marks last_run_date only on (prune AND backup) success so a transient failure gets retried within the 03:00 hour. #11 /health DB probe now exercises the WRITE path via a temp-table INSERT/SELECT/COMMIT round-trip. Previously only read PRAGMA journal_mode + a row count, which silently passes on read-only mounts and broken-WAL conditions. #12 security-scan.sh now fails loudly if `git fetch` or `git reset --hard origin/main` errors (was `|| true`, scanning stale code silently). pip-audit now runs in a throwaway python:3.12-slim container against requirements.txt instead of `docker exec`-ing into the live truenas-burnin container — cleaner separation, no transient package install on prod. #13 Badblocks SSH stage no longer doubles its log_text. Previously appended every 20-line chunk during streaming AND the full accumulated output at end. Now only flushes the un-flushed tail (typically <20 lines). `result["output"]` stays in-memory only. Verification: all 44 unit tests pass in container; /health 200; security scan returns 0 findings; deployed maple build is green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
116 lines
5.3 KiB
Python
116 lines
5.3 KiB
Python
from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, SettingsConfigDict
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class Settings(BaseSettings):
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model_config = SettingsConfigDict(
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env_file=".env",
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env_file_encoding="utf-8",
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case_sensitive=False,
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)
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app_host: str = "0.0.0.0" # nosec B104 — container deliberately binds all interfaces; nginx-proxy-manager fronts it.
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app_port: int = 8080
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db_path: str = "/data/app.db"
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truenas_base_url: str = "http://localhost:8000"
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truenas_api_key: str = "mock-key"
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truenas_verify_tls: bool = False
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poll_interval_seconds: int = 12
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stale_threshold_seconds: int = 45
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max_parallel_burnins: int = 2
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surface_validate_seconds: int = 45 # mock simulation duration
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io_validate_seconds: int = 25 # mock simulation duration
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# Logging
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log_level: str = "INFO"
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# Security — comma-separated IPs or CIDRs, e.g. "10.0.0.0/24,127.0.0.1"
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# Empty string means allow all (default).
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allowed_ips: str = ""
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# SMTP — daily status email at 8am local time
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# Leave smtp_host empty to disable email.
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smtp_host: str = ""
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smtp_port: int = 587
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smtp_user: str = ""
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smtp_password: str = ""
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smtp_from: str = ""
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smtp_to: str = "" # comma-separated recipients
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smtp_report_hour: int = 8 # local hour to send (0-23)
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smtp_daily_report_enabled: bool = True # set False to skip daily report without disabling alerts
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smtp_alert_on_fail: bool = True # immediate email when a job fails
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smtp_alert_on_pass: bool = False # immediate email when a job passes
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smtp_ssl_mode: str = "starttls" # "starttls" | "ssl" | "plain"
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smtp_timeout: int = 60 # connection + read timeout in seconds
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# Webhook — POST JSON payload on every job state change (pass/fail)
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# Leave empty to disable. Works with Slack, Discord, ntfy, n8n, etc.
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webhook_url: str = ""
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# Stuck-job detection: jobs running longer than this are marked 'unknown'
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stuck_job_hours: int = 24
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# Temperature thresholds (°C) — drives table colouring + precheck gate
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temp_warn_c: int = 46 # orange warning
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temp_crit_c: int = 55 # red critical (precheck refuses to start above this)
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# Bad-block tolerance — surface_validate fails if bad blocks exceed this
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bad_block_threshold: int = 0
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# Surface-validate (badblocks) tunables — defaults match the Spearfoot
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# disk-burnin.sh community script's recommended geometry for large HDDs.
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# block_size : -b in bytes; aligned to AF (4 KiB) sectors. Bumping
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# to 8192 roughly halves badblocks runtime on multi-TB
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# drives at the cost of ~2x RAM in the test buffer.
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# block_buffer : -c blocks held in memory per IO. 64 = badblocks
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# default. Higher values = larger buffer, faster IO,
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# more RAM (block_size * block_buffer bytes per pass).
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# passes : -p value. 1 = repeat until one consecutive clean
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# scan (current behavior). 2-3 for paranoid burn-in
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# that re-confirms after finding errors.
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surface_validate_block_size: int = 4096
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surface_validate_block_buffer: int = 64
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surface_validate_passes: int = 1
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# SSH credentials for direct TrueNAS command execution (Stage 7)
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# When ssh_host is set, burn-in stages use SSH for smartctl/badblocks instead of REST API.
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# Leave ssh_host empty to use the mock/REST API (development mode).
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ssh_host: str = ""
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ssh_port: int = 22
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ssh_user: str = "root" # TrueNAS CORE default is root
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ssh_password: str = "" # Password auth (leave blank if using key)
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ssh_key: str = "" # PEM private key content (paste full key including headers)
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# Application version — used by the /api/v1/updates/check endpoint
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app_version: str = "1.0.0-28"
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# ---- Authentication (1.0.0-22) ----
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# session_secret: HMAC key for signing session cookies. Empty = generate
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# one and persist to /data/session_secret on first run (sessions survive
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# restarts but rotate if the file is deleted). Set explicitly via
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# SESSION_SECRET env var if you want to share secrets across replicas.
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session_secret: str = ""
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session_max_age_seconds: int = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 # 7 days
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# Set to True when the dashboard is exclusively reachable over HTTPS
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# (typical when fronted by nginx-proxy-manager with TLS). Refuses to
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# send the session cookie on plain HTTP, eliminating the on-the-wire
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# exposure surface. Leaving False allows initial deploy + LAN testing.
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session_cookie_secure: bool = False
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# Initial admin bootstrap. If both env vars are set AND the users table
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# is empty at startup, create that account immediately. After that the
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# env vars are ignored — change passwords via the UI / database, not
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# by editing compose.yml.
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initial_admin_username: str = ""
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initial_admin_password: str = ""
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# ---- Retention + backup (1.0.0-23) ----
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# log_days : burnin_stages.log_text NULLed out after this many days
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# (history rows themselves are preserved). Default keeps
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# ~5 weeks; long-soak burn-ins typically finish in <2.
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# backup_keep: number of nightly DB snapshots to keep in /data/backups.
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retention_log_days: int = 35
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retention_backup_keep: int = 14
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settings = Settings()
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