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Author SHA1 Message Date
Brandon Walter
a8a7d99621 rename: TrueNAS Burn-In → NAS Burn-In (1.0.0-38)
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Product display name only — page titles, headers, email, browser
notification, FastAPI app title. Repo, container_name, file paths,
and infrastructure identifiers (truenas-burnin everywhere) stay put
to avoid breaking deployment.
2026-05-03 14:01:40 -04:00
Brandon Walter
d4c0770b9e feat: app-level login + hardening sweep (1.0.0-22 -> 1.0.0-23)
Two layered changes shipped in this branch:

== 1.0.0-22: app-level authentication ==

The dashboard previously had only an IP allowlist. Adds username +
bcrypt password auth, signed-cookie sessions, and a "first user setup"
flow.

* New app/auth.py: User dataclass, bcrypt hash/verify, get_user_by_id/
  username, create_user, touch_last_login, FastAPI `get_current_user`
  dependency. Session secret loaded from SESSION_SECRET env or persisted
  to /data/session_secret.
* New app/auth_cli.py: `python -m app.auth_cli list|reset|add` for
  out-of-band user management. Passwords always read from a TTY prompt.
* Schema: idempotent ALTER for `users` table (id, username unique,
  password_hash, full_name, is_admin, created_at, last_login_at).
* main.py: SessionMiddleware (HMAC-signed cookie, max-age 7 days,
  SameSite=strict — see hardening section) + _AuthGateMiddleware that
  populates request.state.current_user and bounces unauth'd HTML GETs
  to /login while returning 401 JSON for everything else.
* Routes: GET /login renders first-user-setup form when users table is
  empty otherwise sign-in form; POST /login; POST /api/v1/auth/setup
  (only works while empty); GET|POST /logout.
* Bootstrap: env vars INITIAL_ADMIN_USERNAME + INITIAL_ADMIN_PASSWORD
  create the first admin on startup if both set AND users table empty.
  Ignored thereafter — change passwords via UI or CLI.
* Layout: header shows current_user.full_name|username + Logout link.
  Modal operator field auto-fills from the logged-in user via
  <meta name="default-operator"> rendered in layout (replaces the
  localStorage-only previous behaviour).
* requirements.txt: pinned bcrypt>=4.0,<5.0, itsdangerous>=2.1,
  python-multipart>=0.0.7. First step toward addressing the
  unpinned-deps gotcha.
* New app/templates/login.html with first-user-setup variant.

== 1.0.0-23: hardening sweep ==

Closes the eight-item gap audit:

* DB retention + automated backup. New app/retention.py runs daily at
  03:00 local. Nulls burnin_stages.log_text on stages older than
  retention_log_days (default 35), VACUUMs to reclaim pages, then runs
  `sqlite3 .backup` to /data/backups/app-YYYY-MM-DD.db keeping the
  retention_backup_keep most recent (default 14). Wired into the
  lifespan supervisor next to mailer/poller.

* CSRF mitigation. SessionMiddleware bumped to SameSite=strict so the
  browser refuses to send the session cookie on cross-site POSTs —
  removes the actual CSRF vector. Trade-off: external links into the
  app require re-auth.

* Login rate limiting. In-memory per-username AND per-source-IP failure
  counters in auth.py. 10 failures within 10 min trips a 15-min lockout
  for both keys. Returns HTTP 429 with a clear "try again in N min"
  message. Cleared on successful login.

* Login audit events. New event types in audit_events: user_login,
  user_login_failed, user_login_locked_out, user_logout,
  user_password_changed. All include source IP. Recorded via
  auth.audit_auth_event().

* Password change UI. Header link "Change password" opens
  templates/components/modal_password.html (current/new/confirm).
  Posts to POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — bcrypt-verifies current,
  requires >=8 char new pw, writes audit event.

* NVMe burn-in path. _stage_surface_validate now detects nvme*
  devnames and routes to _stage_surface_validate_nvme() which runs
  `nvme format -s 1 --force` (cryptographic erase). Seconds vs hours
  of badblocks, exercises the controller's secure-erase. Falls back
  to badblocks if nvme-cli isn't installed. Post-format SMART check.

* Mounted-FS detection. ssh_client.get_mounted_drives() runs
  `findmnt -no SOURCE`, parses non-ZFS sources back to base devnames.
  Poller treats them as pool_name='(mounted)', pool_role='mounted'.
  Confirm token DESTROY MOUNTED FILESYSTEM, distinct purple styling,
  audit event mounted_drive_unlocked, daily-report banner picks it up.

* Deeper /health. Real readiness check — DB write probe (PRAGMA
  journal_mode), poller freshness (age <= 3x stale_threshold), SSH
  test_connection() when configured. Returns 503 when any check fails
  so a proxy/orchestrator can take the container out of rotation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 11:08:29 -04:00