Closes the last open Codex finding (#5) and removes one piece of dead
code Codex flagged in passing.
#5 — Live pool re-check before burn-in start:
Before this change, _is_unlocked compared the operator's unlock grant
against the cached drives.pool_* row. If a drive was imported into a
pool, mounted, or had ZFS labels written between the operator's
unlock click and the next ~12s poll, burn-in could still start
against the stale identity and silently destroy the new pool.
start_job now calls a fresh ssh_client.fresh_pool_check_for_drive()
immediately after the cached gate. That helper re-runs the three
detection probes (zpool list -vHP / lsblk zfs_member / findmnt) over
a fresh SSH session and returns the live answer for one devname.
If it differs from cached state we invalidate any existing unlock
grant and raise PoolMemberError with the FRESH pool name so the UI
reflects current reality. If fresh shows free but cached said locked
the drive came back to free since last poll — log it and allow.
Cost: ~200ms per burn-in start. For batch starts of 12 drives, that's
2.4s extra latency — cheap against destroying a freshly-imported pool.
Dead code removal:
ssh_client.run_badblocks() — no callers since 1.0.0-13 when the SSH
badblocks logic was inlined into burnin._stage_surface_validate_ssh
(with the asyncssh-signal-doesn't-actually-kill workaround). Removing
the dead function also lets us drop the now-unused
`from typing import Callable` import.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses 12 of 13 findings from the Codex tech-debt + security review
of versions 1.0.0-22 through 1.0.0-27. Item #5 (live pool re-check
before start_job) deferred — would add an SSH round-trip per start.
#1 Pool detection now treats zpool / lsblk / findmnt failures
INDEPENDENTLY. Previously a single None blew away the whole map,
so a host where lsblk lacks zfs_member info but zpool works would
never lock pool members. Extended findmnt parser to recognise
/dev/mapper/*, /dev/dm-*, /dev/md*, /dev/da*, /dev/ada* (LVM,
devicemapper, MD RAID, FreeBSD CORE devnames).
#2 Admin role enforced on every settings mutation. New
auth.require_admin() helper applied to GET /settings,
POST /api/v1/settings, /test-smtp, /test-ssh. Previously any
authenticated user (the CLI explicitly supports non-admin
accounts) could rewrite SMTP/SSH/API secrets.
#3 First-user setup race closed. auth.create_user() now accepts
bootstrap_only=True which wraps the existence check + insert in
BEGIN IMMEDIATE so two concurrent /api/v1/auth/setup requests
can't both create admin accounts during the bootstrap window.
#4 Case-insensitive uniqueness enforced via new
`uniq_users_username_nocase` index. Login does NOCASE lookup so
without this `Admin` and `admin` could coexist as distinct rows.
#6 New `session_cookie_secure` setting (default False for LAN/dev
deploys, set True in production behind HTTPS) flips the session
cookie's Secure flag. Defends against on-the-wire exposure when
the dashboard is reachable over plain HTTP.
#7 Audit trail bound to authenticated identity. Burn-in start /
cancel / unlock / drive reset all now use `_operator_for(request)`
which reads `request.state.current_user.full_name|username`
instead of the body's operator field. Logged-in users can no
longer spoof attribution. Drive reset's literal-"operator"
fallback (window._operator was never set) is also fixed by this.
#8 Login rate-limit race fixed. New `register_login_attempt()` is
atomic check-AND-increment in synchronous code (no awaits inside),
so a parallel burst can't slip past the threshold.
`record_login_failure()` removed; `clear_login_failures()` now
also drops any active lockout for a successful auth. Pre-existing
bug where `tripped` was always False (so user_login_locked_out
audit events never fired) also fixed.
#9 NVMe surface_validate post-format check now mirrors the SSH path:
fails on FAILED health AND on real SMART attribute failures,
soft-passes SSH-only failures (logged), surfaces warnings to the
stage log without failing.
#10 retention.backup_db() now writes to `.tmp` then atomic-renames
into the canonical daily slot — an interrupted backup leaves the
tmp behind but doesn't corrupt the real snapshot. Scheduler marks
last_run_date only on (prune AND backup) success so a transient
failure gets retried within the 03:00 hour.
#11 /health DB probe now exercises the WRITE path via a temp-table
INSERT/SELECT/COMMIT round-trip. Previously only read PRAGMA
journal_mode + a row count, which silently passes on read-only
mounts and broken-WAL conditions.
#12 security-scan.sh now fails loudly if `git fetch` or
`git reset --hard origin/main` errors (was `|| true`, scanning
stale code silently). pip-audit now runs in a throwaway
python:3.12-slim container against requirements.txt instead of
`docker exec`-ing into the live truenas-burnin container —
cleaner separation, no transient package install on prod.
#13 Badblocks SSH stage no longer doubles its log_text. Previously
appended every 20-line chunk during streaming AND the full
accumulated output at end. Now only flushes the un-flushed tail
(typically <20 lines). `result["output"]` stays in-memory only.
Verification: all 44 unit tests pass in container; /health 200;
security scan returns 0 findings; deployed maple build is green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two layered changes shipped in this branch:
== 1.0.0-22: app-level authentication ==
The dashboard previously had only an IP allowlist. Adds username +
bcrypt password auth, signed-cookie sessions, and a "first user setup"
flow.
* New app/auth.py: User dataclass, bcrypt hash/verify, get_user_by_id/
username, create_user, touch_last_login, FastAPI `get_current_user`
dependency. Session secret loaded from SESSION_SECRET env or persisted
to /data/session_secret.
* New app/auth_cli.py: `python -m app.auth_cli list|reset|add` for
out-of-band user management. Passwords always read from a TTY prompt.
* Schema: idempotent ALTER for `users` table (id, username unique,
password_hash, full_name, is_admin, created_at, last_login_at).
* main.py: SessionMiddleware (HMAC-signed cookie, max-age 7 days,
SameSite=strict — see hardening section) + _AuthGateMiddleware that
populates request.state.current_user and bounces unauth'd HTML GETs
to /login while returning 401 JSON for everything else.
* Routes: GET /login renders first-user-setup form when users table is
empty otherwise sign-in form; POST /login; POST /api/v1/auth/setup
(only works while empty); GET|POST /logout.
* Bootstrap: env vars INITIAL_ADMIN_USERNAME + INITIAL_ADMIN_PASSWORD
create the first admin on startup if both set AND users table empty.
Ignored thereafter — change passwords via UI or CLI.
* Layout: header shows current_user.full_name|username + Logout link.
Modal operator field auto-fills from the logged-in user via
<meta name="default-operator"> rendered in layout (replaces the
localStorage-only previous behaviour).
* requirements.txt: pinned bcrypt>=4.0,<5.0, itsdangerous>=2.1,
python-multipart>=0.0.7. First step toward addressing the
unpinned-deps gotcha.
* New app/templates/login.html with first-user-setup variant.
== 1.0.0-23: hardening sweep ==
Closes the eight-item gap audit:
* DB retention + automated backup. New app/retention.py runs daily at
03:00 local. Nulls burnin_stages.log_text on stages older than
retention_log_days (default 35), VACUUMs to reclaim pages, then runs
`sqlite3 .backup` to /data/backups/app-YYYY-MM-DD.db keeping the
retention_backup_keep most recent (default 14). Wired into the
lifespan supervisor next to mailer/poller.
* CSRF mitigation. SessionMiddleware bumped to SameSite=strict so the
browser refuses to send the session cookie on cross-site POSTs —
removes the actual CSRF vector. Trade-off: external links into the
app require re-auth.
* Login rate limiting. In-memory per-username AND per-source-IP failure
counters in auth.py. 10 failures within 10 min trips a 15-min lockout
for both keys. Returns HTTP 429 with a clear "try again in N min"
message. Cleared on successful login.
* Login audit events. New event types in audit_events: user_login,
user_login_failed, user_login_locked_out, user_logout,
user_password_changed. All include source IP. Recorded via
auth.audit_auth_event().
* Password change UI. Header link "Change password" opens
templates/components/modal_password.html (current/new/confirm).
Posts to POST /api/v1/auth/change-password — bcrypt-verifies current,
requires >=8 char new pw, writes audit event.
* NVMe burn-in path. _stage_surface_validate now detects nvme*
devnames and routes to _stage_surface_validate_nvme() which runs
`nvme format -s 1 --force` (cryptographic erase). Seconds vs hours
of badblocks, exercises the controller's secure-erase. Falls back
to badblocks if nvme-cli isn't installed. Post-format SMART check.
* Mounted-FS detection. ssh_client.get_mounted_drives() runs
`findmnt -no SOURCE`, parses non-ZFS sources back to base devnames.
Poller treats them as pool_name='(mounted)', pool_role='mounted'.
Confirm token DESTROY MOUNTED FILESYSTEM, distinct purple styling,
audit event mounted_drive_unlocked, daily-report banner picks it up.
* Deeper /health. Real readiness check — DB write probe (PRAGMA
journal_mode), poller freshness (age <= 3x stale_threshold), SSH
test_connection() when configured. Returns 503 when any check fails
so a proxy/orchestrator can take the container out of rotation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Substantial feature + reliability sweep. Each version below was developed,
tested live against the maple/TrueNAS deployment, and Codex-reviewed
before bundling.
1.0.0-13 — asyncssh proc.kill() doesn't actually kill the remote process
(sshd ignores SSH signal-channel requests by default), so a cancel of a
long-running badblocks left the remote process running and proc.wait()
hanging — pinning the asyncio.Semaphore slot forever.
* Wrap long-lived commands in `sh -c 'echo PID:$$; exec <cmd>'` to
capture the remote PID; store in burnin._remote_pids[job_id].
* burnin._kill_remote_process(job_id) opens a fresh SSH session and
issues `kill -9 <pid>` — sshd honours that.
* Bound proc.wait() with asyncio.wait_for(timeout=15).
* burnin._active_tasks tracks every _run_job task so cancel_job and
check_stuck_jobs can actually cancel the asyncio task (was DB-only
before). Also fixes the documented asyncio.create_task GC gotcha
(weak refs only).
* _run_job finalizer reads current state and skips the write if state
!= 'running' so cancelled/unknown aren't clobbered.
1.0.0-14 — poller._upsert_drive ON CONFLICT only refreshed temperature/
health/poll timestamps; devname/serial/model/size_bytes were stuck at
first-INSERT values forever. After kernel SCSI re-enumeration two
drives could both show as `sda`. Fixed by updating all six fields.
Also added 7-day stale filter to _DRIVES_QUERY so removed drives drop
off the dashboard while audit/burnin_jobs FKs stay intact.
1.0.0-15/-16 — pool-membership lock.
* ssh_client.get_pool_membership() runs `zpool list -vHP` and parses
the flattened TrueNAS output (container vdevs + their device children
both appear at depth 1; section markers cache/log/spare/special/dedup
switch the role).
* ssh_client.get_zfs_member_drives() runs `lsblk -no NAME,FSTYPE -l`
to detect drives carrying ZFS labels not in any active pool — they
get pool_name='(exported)', pool_role='exported'.
* Three idempotent ALTER TABLE migrations on drives:
pool_name/pool_role/pool_seen_at.
* burnin.start_job raises PoolMemberError if pool_name IS NOT NULL and
the drive isn't in burnin._unlock_grants. Routes layer maps to 409
with structured detail {pool_name, pool_role, pool_locked: true} so
the frontend can render an unlock affordance.
* POST /api/v1/drives/{id}/unlock accepts {confirm_token, operator,
reason}. Token is the pool name for active pools, "DESTROY BOOT POOL"
for boot-pool, "DESTROY EXPORTED POOL" for exported. Reason >= 5
chars. TTL = UNLOCK_TTL_SECONDS = 600. Audit event types:
pool_drive_unlocked / boot_pool_drive_unlocked /
exported_pool_drive_unlocked.
* Grants are in-memory only — container restart wipes them.
* UI: lock icon (yellow/red/orange), pool pill, conditional Unlock vs
Burn-In button. modal_unlock.html with type-to-confirm field.
Live unlock countdown via tickUnlockCountdowns() in app.js.
* Daily report: red banner listing every unlock event from the last
24h, with operator + reason + timestamp.
1.0.0-17 — Codex review fail-open + XSS + structured-error fixes.
* ssh_client.get_pool_membership / get_zfs_member_drives now return
None on failure (vs {} for 'definitely empty'). poller passes
update_pool=False to _upsert_drive on detection failure, preserving
existing pool columns instead of clearing them. Without this fix a
1-second SSH blip silently unlocked every drive.
* mailer._build_unlock_banner_html escapes every interpolated field
via html.escape() (was '<' only). Time filter switched to
julianday() — string >= against datetime('now', '-1 day') compared
formats with different separators ('T' vs ' ') and timezone
suffixes, causing subtle off-by-N-hour inclusion.
* app.js submitStart/submitBatchStart now detect the structured
pool_locked 409 detail and auto-open the unlock modal for the
offending drive (was [object Object] in toast).
1.0.0-18 — Codex grant-binding + commit-ordering fixes.
* Unlock grants bound to the (pool_name, pool_role) observed at unlock
time. _UnlockGrant dataclass; _is_unlocked and unlock_expiry
invalidate the grant if the live row's pool identity has changed.
Prevents an 'exported' unlock from carrying over when the drive
turns out to be in active 'tank' or 'boot-pool'.
* grant_pool_unlock now writes to _unlock_grants only AFTER db.commit()
succeeds — previously a failed audit insert left an unaudited grant
armed.
1.0.0-19 — Codex race + cancellation classification + test scaffold.
* Partial unique index uniq_active_burnin_per_drive ON burnin_jobs
(drive_id) WHERE state IN ('queued','running'). INSERT now wraps in
try/except aiosqlite.IntegrityError -> ValueError so the read-then-
insert race in start_job can't produce two queued rows for the same
drive.
* _run_job tracks was_cancelled flag; on bare task.cancel() (shutdown,
future code paths) where DB state is still 'running', finalizer
writes 'unknown' instead of mis-classifying as 'failed'.
* tests/ stdlib unittest scaffold:
- test_pool_parser.py (21 tests): mirror/raidz/draid container vdevs,
single-disk depth-1, plural section markers, partition stripping,
sdaa-style names, multi-pool, role reset between pools.
- test_unlock_flow.py (18 tests): token validation per pool kind,
identity-binding invalidation, TTL expiry, audit-commit-then-arm
ordering, unique-active-burnin partial index.
Run via `python -m unittest discover tests/`. No new dependencies.
1.0.0-20 — Spearfoot-inspired badblocks tunables.
* surface_validate_block_size (-b, default 4096), surface_validate_
block_buffer (-c, default 64), surface_validate_passes (-p, default
1) exposed in Settings UI; persist via settings_store.json.
Validation: block size must be a power of 2 between 512 and
1048576. Defaults preserve existing behaviour. Bumping to 8192/64/1
roughly halves runtime on multi-TB HDDs at ~2x RAM cost.
1.0.0-21 — SMART overall-health column actually populated.
* /api/v2.0/disk doesn't expose smart_health, so every drive defaulted
to UNKNOWN forever (only burn-in stages ever wrote a real value).
* ssh_client.get_smart_health_map([devnames]) runs `smartctl -H` for
all drives in a single SSH session, deterministically delimited with
@@devname@@ ... @@END@@ markers. Returns {devname: PASSED|FAILED|
UNKNOWN} or None on SSH failure.
* poller calls it every 5th cycle (~1 min at default 12s interval),
caches in _state['smart_health_cache'] so transient failures preserve
the previous values.
* Dashboard CSS: col-smart min-width 150 -> 95, horizontal padding 14
-> 6 so Short/Long SMART columns fit comfortably on a 13-inch
display.
* 5 additional parser tests (44 total, all passing).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brandon Walter