Matches the 1.0.0-38 product display rename. Touches every
infrastructure identifier:
- container_name: truenas-burnin → nas-burnin
- forge URL in /api/v1/updates/check
- security-scan: REPO_URL, REPO, DEPLOY_DIR, systemd unit description
- run-tests.sh default container name
- doc paths in README/SPEC/CLAUDE
- in-app instruction strings (login.html, settings.html, auth_cli.py)
Maple migration done in lockstep:
docker compose down (truenas-burnin)
mv ~/docker/stacks/{truenas-burnin,nas-burnin}
systemd unit ExecStart updated + daemon-reload
docker compose up -d --build → container nas-burnin
Old image truenas-burnin-app removed (~12 GB reclaimed)
Stale top-level orphans cleaned (config.py, poller.py, routes.py,
truenas.py, tests/) — all dead since pre-split refactors
Forge repo rename (git.hellocomputer.xyz/brandon/truenas-burnin →
nas-burnin) is a separate UI-only step. Forgejo redirects the old
URL after rename, so this commit can be pushed to the existing
remote first; remote URL gets updated locally once you rename.
Two layers of defence-in-depth scanning:
* `.forgejo/workflows/security-scan.yml` — runs pip-audit, bandit, and
gitleaks on every push, every PR, and nightly at 07:00 UTC. Activates
when the forge has a runner; harmless no-op until then. Bandit is
invoked with `--skip B608` because every dynamic SQL build in this
codebase uses bound parameters for data and structural placeholders
only — we still catch real injection through code review.
* `scripts/security-scan.sh` + systemd `service`/`timer` — maple-side
daily scanner that runs the same three tools entirely in containers
(no host pollution). Differences from the forge job:
- pip-audit runs INSIDE the live container against installed
packages, catching new CVEs in transitives requirements.txt
doesn't pin (e.g. starlette breaking changes shipping in 1.0).
- bandit scans the LIVE deploy dir at
~/docker/stacks/truenas-burnin/app/, not a fresh git checkout —
so drift between forge HEAD and prod surfaces here too.
- gitleaks scans a managed clone in ~/scan-checkouts/, kept
fast-forward to origin/main.
Output: ~/security-scans/scan-YYYY-MM-DD/{summary,pip-audit,bandit,
gitleaks}.txt with 30-day retention. ~/security-scans/findings.log
appended on any non-zero exit. SECURITY_SCAN_WEBHOOK env in the
service unit lets you POST findings to Mattermost / Slack / etc. once
you decide where alerts should land.
First-run findings already actioned in this commit:
* pip-audit caught 3 CVEs in `pip` itself (CVE-2025-8869,
CVE-2026-1703, CVE-2026-3219). Dockerfile now upgrades pip to
>=26.0 before installing the rest.
* bandit's B608 SQL-injection heuristic flagged two f-string SQL
constructions in `_upsert_drive` and `_fetch_drives_for_template`.
Both were structural concatenation (column-list selection,
'?,?,?' placeholder count), not data interpolation, but refactored
from f-string to explicit concatenation so a future reviewer
doesn't have to relitigate.
* bandit's B104 (binding to 0.0.0.0) annotated with inline `# nosec
B104` — container deliberately binds all interfaces; nginx-proxy-
manager fronts it.
* gitleaks: 0 secrets across 14 commits. Clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
