Closes the unpinned-deps gotcha that broke production once already
(Starlette 1.0 shipping in 2026-04 changed the TemplateResponse
signature; our floating requirements.txt picked it up on the next
rebuild and the dashboard 500'd until 1.0.0-12 patched the call sites).
Mechanics:
* `requirements.in` — human-edited input, identical contents to the
old `requirements.txt`.
* `requirements.txt` — now an autogenerated lockfile (876 lines, every
transitive pinned with sha256 hashes). Regenerated via
`scripts/regenerate-lockfile.sh`, which runs `pip-compile
--generate-hashes --strip-extras` in a clean python:3.12-slim
container so the script has no host dependencies.
* Dockerfile installs with `pip install --require-hashes` — refuses
any package whose sha256 doesn't match the lockfile, defending
against compromised PyPI mirrors and accidental version drift.
Verification:
* Container boots clean on the hash-locked install (1.0.0-25).
* /health returns 200 with all checks green.
* Daily security scan (pip-audit + bandit + gitleaks) returns 0 findings
against the new lockfile.
Future deps changes: edit requirements.in, run the regenerate script,
review the diff, rebuild, commit both files. README §"Updating
dependencies" walks through it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two layers of defence-in-depth scanning:
* `.forgejo/workflows/security-scan.yml` — runs pip-audit, bandit, and
gitleaks on every push, every PR, and nightly at 07:00 UTC. Activates
when the forge has a runner; harmless no-op until then. Bandit is
invoked with `--skip B608` because every dynamic SQL build in this
codebase uses bound parameters for data and structural placeholders
only — we still catch real injection through code review.
* `scripts/security-scan.sh` + systemd `service`/`timer` — maple-side
daily scanner that runs the same three tools entirely in containers
(no host pollution). Differences from the forge job:
- pip-audit runs INSIDE the live container against installed
packages, catching new CVEs in transitives requirements.txt
doesn't pin (e.g. starlette breaking changes shipping in 1.0).
- bandit scans the LIVE deploy dir at
~/docker/stacks/truenas-burnin/app/, not a fresh git checkout —
so drift between forge HEAD and prod surfaces here too.
- gitleaks scans a managed clone in ~/scan-checkouts/, kept
fast-forward to origin/main.
Output: ~/security-scans/scan-YYYY-MM-DD/{summary,pip-audit,bandit,
gitleaks}.txt with 30-day retention. ~/security-scans/findings.log
appended on any non-zero exit. SECURITY_SCAN_WEBHOOK env in the
service unit lets you POST findings to Mattermost / Slack / etc. once
you decide where alerts should land.
First-run findings already actioned in this commit:
* pip-audit caught 3 CVEs in `pip` itself (CVE-2025-8869,
CVE-2026-1703, CVE-2026-3219). Dockerfile now upgrades pip to
>=26.0 before installing the rest.
* bandit's B608 SQL-injection heuristic flagged two f-string SQL
constructions in `_upsert_drive` and `_fetch_drives_for_template`.
Both were structural concatenation (column-list selection,
'?,?,?' placeholder count), not data interpolation, but refactored
from f-string to explicit concatenation so a future reviewer
doesn't have to relitigate.
* bandit's B104 (binding to 0.0.0.0) annotated with inline `# nosec
B104` — container deliberately binds all interfaces; nginx-proxy-
manager fronts it.
* gitleaks: 0 secrets across 14 commits. Clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
